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Abstract  
The diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) payment system was established in the 1960s. 
Details of DRG-based payment system vary by country. The Diagnosis-Related Group 
payments system in Taiwan (Tw-DRG) was established in 2009 in order to contain medical 
costs and enhance medical efficiency under a universal coverage, single-payment insurance 
system: National Health Insurance (NHI). This capstone reviews the study literature about the 
history of DRGs payment system establishment, processes of medical reform, as well as the 
implementation and outcomes of Tw-DRGS. According to the studies reviewed there were 
changes of medical behaviors after the implementation of Tw-DRGs which included an 
increase of medical efficiency and an slightly declining intensity of care which are indicated 
by the number of order for medication, diagnosis and treatment during hospitalization. No 
significant change was found in patient health outcomes. The financial impacts on different 
levels of hospitals, departments or specific clinical items varied. Generally, the profitability 
was negatively impacted. Another potential problem noted concerns the disease severity and 
explanatory power of Tw-DRGs. Higher illness severity was related to more medical resource 
utilization. Due to the lower explanatory power of Tw-DRGs, there exists a lack of 
accounting for illness severity could lead to cost shifting or patient dumping.  
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Introduction 
    The Diagnosis-Related Group payments system in Taiwan (Tw-DRG) was established in 
2009, with the intention of cost containment and enhancement of medical efficiency within a 
single-payment, universal coverage insurance system. The purpose of this capstone is to 
review existing literature in order to establish the outcomes of implement ting the Tw-DRG. 
The organization is as follows: first, a literature review details the history of DRGs 
payment system establishment in the U.S. and other countries. The second section details the 
processes of medical reform and implementation of DRGs in Taiwan. The third section 
discusses the outcomes of Tw-DRGs implementation by reviewing recent studies in Taiwan 
and compares the results to studies of DRGs-based payment system in other countries. 
There are many differences between DRG-based payments according to country. 
Taiwan has a national health insurance system (NHI) that is a single payer system. Learning 
about the outcomes of DRGs implementation in Taiwan could influence future healthcare 
reform in the United States and other countries. 
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Background Information 
Establishment and implementation of DRGs in the United States 
Robert B. Fetter, PhD of the School of Management, and John D. Thompson, MPH of 
the School of Public Health, first established the diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) payment 
system in the1960s at Yale University. DRGs were established: (1) to control the rising cost 
of the Medicare program; (2) to bolster hospital management; (3) to improve work efficiency; 
(4) to reduce unnecessary length of stay (LOS); (5) to promote usage efficiency of medical 
resources (manpower and equipment) cost. These changes would ideally put an emphasis on 
physicians’ team work in order to prevent unnecessary tests and services, increase health care 
efficiency, avoiding excessive treatment behavior, premised on maintaining quality of 
medical services (Chang, 1984).  
Fetter and Thompson used AUTOGRP computer programs to analyze patient 
information from 18 Connecticut hospitals. Collecting data from approximately 500,000 
cases, the team then grouped diagnoses of similar patients, based on statistical analyses of 
clinical conditions and decisions made by doctors. This was the first step in forming the 
major diagnostic categories (MDCs) which were to collapse the numbers of diagnostic codes 
into meaningful, but broad, sub-groups, with 83 MDCs in the original DRGs version. Then, 
they analyzed the diagnostic group data on factors such as meaningfulness of diagnostic 
decisions making, medical spending homogeneity and variability. They also took into 
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consideration factors such as LOS, age, sex, surgical situation, treatment complications, et al. 
Adjusting for analyzing through these factors, Fetter and Thompson’s classification system of 
Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) emerged as patient classification system to relate types of 
cases with costs incurred by medical facilities.  
    U.S. Medical costs skyrocketed in the 1980s, states and the medical industry were eager 
to devise new payment methods for effectively controlling runaway growth (Cheng, et al., 
2012; W. C. Hsiao, et al., 1986). During the same period New Jersey replaced the Standard 
Hospital Accounting and Rate Evaluation (SHARE) system with a DRG-based prospective 
all-payer system for inpatient reimbursement (W C Hsiao, et al., 1986; May, 1984). Hospitals 
were phased into this system over three years. Prices were fixed in advance for services based 
on diagnosis and historic average treatment costs for patients discharged within this system. 
Actual medical resource costs were not factored in to the equation. The popularity of DRGs 
grew rapidly for two reasons: first, state officials wanted to switch reimbursement from per 
diem to case-mix-based payment approach. Second, the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) supported state-managed payment experiments to explore 
administrative feasibility of implementing diagnosis-related predetermined reimbursement 
(W.C. Hsiao, et al., 1986). 
DRGs payment system proved useful as a convenient cost management tool in order to 
manage economical growth throughout diagnosis and to utilize a clinical situation 
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classification system. The public expected the medical and healthcare payment industry to 
control rising medical costs. In order to address this concern, the federal government made 
reference to the New Jersey DRG system implementation experience and formally 
implemented DRGs into Medicare in 1983 (Stern & Epsterin,1985). 
    The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) established Diagnosis-Related 
Groups in the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services CMS-DRGs as the new Medicare 
Prospective Payment System (PPS). All medical facilities participating in Medicare were 
covered by the CMS-DRGs with the exception of rehabilitation, psychiatric care, children’s 
hospitals, long term care facilities, and substance abuse treatment units (Yan, 2011). However, 
there were controversies about the CMS-DRGs. First, CMS-DRGs failed to reflect the 
disease severity and medical resource utilization situation (Freeman et al, 1995；Averill et al, 
1998). Second, the first version of CMS-DRGs was designed mainly for the aged and 
disabled populations rather than comprehensive coverage of all populations. There were 
difficulties implementing CMS-DRGs payment system in specific populations: e.g., 
newborns, substance abuse patients, or those suffering from AIDS (Yan, 2011). 
    Variant DRGs were designed by diverse organizations: Refined-DRGs (R-DRGs) by 
Yale University in 1985, All Patient DRGs (AP-DRGs) with cooperation of the New York 
State Department of Health and 3M Health Information System in 1987, the All-Patient 
Refined (APR) DRGs by the New Jersey State government in 1988, International Refined 
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DRGs (IR-DRGs) by 3M Health Information in 2001, and Medicare Severity-Adjusted DRG 
(MS-DRGs) by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Service (CMS) in 2007 (Healthcare 
Financial Management, 2008). Currently, Medicare utilizes the MS-DRGs version. It was 
designed to improve the impact of disease severity on the medical resource utilization by 
adding 207 new DRG coding items and re-dividing each DRG into three different grades of 
disease severity: with major complication/comorbidity (MCC), with 
complication/comorbidity (CC) and without either (MCC/CC) (Sipkoff, 2008). 
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DRGs implementation worldwide 
Following the United States’ example, many countries launched their own DRG-based 
medical payment systems. France modified the original version of DRGs to develop Groups 
Homogenes de Malades 1 (GHM1) which was implemented in 1986. In 1992, Australia 
implemented the Australian National DRGs (AN DRGs) based on their healthcare system. 
Other European countries like Hungary (1993), Italy (1995), Spain (1997), Denmark (2002), 
Germany (2003) and England (2003) implemented modified DRGs based payment system 
(Tseng, 2002). South Korea was the first country in Asia to use DRGs-based payment system 
to curb rising medical expenditures. Since 1997, Korean health institutions implemented 25 
DRGs from selected groups of diseases or medical procedures such as caesarean section, 
appendectomy and tonsillectomy (Kwon, 2003). In 1998, Japan faced a rapidly aging 
population and a stagnant economy, in order to address the rising medical costs the Japanese 
government shifted conventional fee-for-service payment system into a modified case 
classification with 2,552 groups, the Diagnosis Procedure Combination (DPC) (Shinichi, et 
al., 2005). To date, over 20 countries have implemented DRG-based payment system in 
modified form around the world (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013; Shinichi, et al., 
2005; Kwon, 2003). 
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Table 1 DRG version around the world 
COURTRY DRG VERSION 
Australia AR-DRG 
Austria Leistungsbezogene Diagnosis-Fallgruppen(LDF) 
Belgium APR-DRG 
Bulgaria AP-DRG 
Canada CMG 
Czech Republic IR DRG 
Denmark DK-DRG & DAGs 
Finland Nord-DRG 
France GHM, EfP 
Germany G-DRG(AR-DRG) 
United Kingdom HRG 
Greece HCFA-DRG 
Hungary HDG 
Iceland DRG-O & Nord-DRG 
Ireland AR-DRG 
Italy APR-DRG 
Japan DPC 
Netherlands DBC 
Norway Nord-DRG 
Poland Catalogue of Health care products 
Portugal HCFA-DRG 
Romania HCFA-DRG, IR-DRG 
Spain HCFA-DRG 
Sweden Nord-DRG 
U.S. MS DRG 
Sources: Forgione et al., 2004; Han, 2010 
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DRGs payment system in Taiwan 
Medical reform and establishment of National Health Insurance 
In April 1995 the government inaugurated the National Health Insurance (NHI) program 
to provide universal basic health services, and improve accessibility to medical care for all 
citizens. Everyone, excluding convicts, is obligated to pay premiums to the Bureau of 
National Health Insurance (BNHI) and obtain medical resources with comprehensive uniform 
benefits package from NHI, a single-payer social insurance program administered by the 
government. 
Figure 1. National Health Insurance system in Taiwan 
   
  
 
 
 
  
 
Adapted from Bureau of National Health Insurance 2013 
Figure 1 shows BNHI collecting premiums from the insured population. According to 
original NHI programs, premiums are calculated based on an insured person’s regular salary 
Bureau of NHI 
Insured Providers 
All citizens are obligated  
Global Budget 
Single payer 
DRGs based payment 
Premium from: 
Individuals 
Employers 
government 
+ Others 
Services 
Out of pocket cost 
Premiums 
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(Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013). There is no compulsory referral gatekeeper 
mechanism. Insured people seek medical service with nearly complete freedom of choice 
(Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013; Cheng et al., 2012). BNHI also pays fees to 
health care facilities based on fee-for-service plans according to ‘resource-based points of 
value’ (Chang, 2013). Periodically, the BHNI and medical service providers negotiate the 
value of each point in the local environment with consideration of local difference. Still, due 
to extending of coverage, elevating prices, new technology and aging population, revenues of 
NHI have lagged behind expenses since 1997, the third year after NHI has been launched 
(Lin, et al, 2006; Tseng, 2012). 
By 2009, it was estimated that over 90% of all health care facilities, including medical 
centers, local hospitals and clinics (the majority of medical treatment, procedures, and even 
certain preventive services) were covered by NHI (Cheng et al., 2012). To control escalating 
medical costs, which had become a heavy financial burden on the government, the BNHI 
introduced strategies like case-payment scheme (Cheng et al., 2012); a Pharmaceutical 
Benefit Scheme (PBS) (Chang, 2013; Chi-Liang et al., 2008); a copayment increase (Cheng 
et al., 2012) and global budget program (Cheng et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2007). The global 
budget program was achieved by reducing unnecessary treatment caused by traditional 
fee-for-service programs. 
However, one study demonstrated that over 90% medical facilities increased care 
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intensity as a way to enhance revenues under the global budget program of NHI (Cheng, 
2009). By 2010, the overall national financial shortfall of NHI had reached NT$101.5 billion. 
If nothing changed, it was expected there would be a financial gap of NT$222.2 billion in 
2012. These financial gaps led BNHI to decide to implement DRGs payment system in the 
NHI program comprehensively (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2012). 
Implementing Tw-DRGs payment system 
Since the NHI began in 1995, BNHI implemented a special case-payment scheme, 
which reimbursed fixed amount predetermined money for every surgical procedure 
performed in-patient: e.g., Caesarean Section, Appendectomy. Coverage under this scheme 
had been expanded yearly to cover forty-nine hospitalized and four out-patient services 
(Inguinal Herniorrhaphy, Disposal of Pneumonia and Pleurisy, Disposal of Anal Fistula, and 
Adnexal Surgery) in 2009 (Tseng, 2012). This could be seen as a prototype of later NHI 
payment change, but it drew criticism due to a lack of adjustment mechanism for a patient’s 
age, sex, and complication/comorbidity (Cheng et al., 2012). From 1998-2002, BNHI 
gradually promoted a macro-control medical cost policy in dental reimbursement with several 
orientations: global budget payment system, case-payment, and pay-for-performance (Tseng, 
2012). 
The idea of devising a Taiwanese version of Diagnosis Related Groups (Tw-DRGs) had 
been discussed since 2000 (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013). BNHI used the 18th 
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version of the U.S. DRG as foundation, provided by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (Former Health Care Financing Administration) and negotiated with various medical 
experts to design a classification framework reflecting local health care needs (Tseng, 2012). 
 
Figure 2 Tw-DRGs Schematic classifications for In-patient cases 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013 
 
As figure 2 shows, each case is categorized based on principal diagnosis, primary 
medical procedure, complications, gender, age, and health outcome upon patient discharge 
under Tw-DRG program. Medical facilities get roughly the same predetermined 
reimbursement point value. BNHI used International Classification of Disease, Ninth 
Revision Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) and Major Diagnostic Categories (MDC) as 
diagnosis coding.  
In-patient cases in 
Tw-DRGs 
MDCs 
(Major Diagnostic 
Categories) 
Classified as organ 
or physiological 
systems 
 
25MDC+Pre-MDC 
Diagnosis 
C/C 
Procedure 
Outcome 
Sex 
Age 
 
DRG1 
DRG2 
DRG3 
| 
DRGn 
 
n=1017 in 2014 
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Table 2 shows the MDC schematic classifications for in-patient cases.  
Table 2. Major Diagnostic Categories (MDC) in Tw-DRG  
MDC Diseases and disorders of the nervous system  
MDC2 Diseases and disorders of the eye 
MDC3 Diseases and disorders of the ear, nose, mouth and throat 
MDC4 Diseases and disorders of the respiratory system 
MDC5 Diseases and disorders of the circulatory system 
MDC6 Diseases and disorders of the digestive system 
MDC7 Diseases and disorders of the hepatobiliary system and pancreas 
MDC8 Diseases and disorders of the musculoskeletal system and the connective tissue 
MDC9 Diseases and disorders of the skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast 
MDC10 Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases and disorders 
MDC11 Diseases and disorders of the kidney and urinary tract 
MDC12 Diseases and disorders of the male reproductive system 
MDC13 Diseases and disorders of the female reproductive system 
MDC14 Pregnancy and the childbirth 
MDC15 Newborns and other neonates with conditions originating in the perinatal period  
MDC16 Diseases and disorders of the blood and blood forming organs and immunological 
disorders 
MDC17 Myeloproliferative diseases and disorders, and poorly differentiated neoplasms 
MDC18 Infectious and parasitic diseases 
MDC19 Excluded from Tw-DRG 
MDC20 Excluded from Tw-DRG 
MDC21 Injuries, poisonings and toxic effects of drugs 
MDC22 Burns 
MDC23 Factors influencing health status and other contracts with health 
MDC24 Multiple significant trauma 
Pre-MDC Heart Transplant 
Liver Transplant 
Bone Marrow Transplant 
Tracheostomy 
Lung Transplant 
Pancreatic Transplant 
Source: Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2014 
Figure 3 Example of Tw-DRGs payment classification system 
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Adapted from Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013 
 
BNHI believe this system gives medical facilities greater incentive to raise health care 
service efficiency, reduce medical resource expenditure and equalize medical resource 
distribution (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013). At a practical level, BNHI updated 
the fee-charging standards for requesting data from the Insurer of National Health Insurance, 
and standard of filing fees for The National Health Insurance Certificate. Beginning in 
January 2010, BNHI gradually and comprehensively implemented Tw-DRGs, with a total of 
1,029 diagnosis-related groups phased in over five years (Bureau of National Health 
Insurance, 2013). Table 3 lists the situations that were uncovered by Tw-DRGs.  
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Table 3. Situation uncovered by Tw-DRGs 
DISEASE  DIAGNOSIS CODES 
Case of malignant tumors as principal 
diagnosis 
140.XX-176.XX, 179.XX-208.XX, V58.0, 
V58.1, V67.1, V67.2 
Psychiatric case MDC19, MDC20 
Case with diagnosis of AIDS 042 
Case of coagulation disorders 286.0-286.3, 286.7 
Other rare disease that has been announced  
by BNHI 
 
Case in clinical pilot project or study  
Case of hospitalization exceeding 30 day  
Source: Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2011 
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Outcome of DRG Implementation in Taiwan 
Changes of Medical Behaviors and Health Outcome 
Earlier studies evaluating how DRGs payment system affects intensity of care proved 
less inconclusive in other countries. Some studies suggested the DRGs payment system 
reduced the care intensity of medical service providers (Palmer, 1989; Long, 1987). However, 
another study showed no significant change in this regard (Cutler 1995). Reducing intensity 
of care and LOS could adversely affect patient outcome. One study found mortality slightly 
higher after introducing DRGs (Culter, 1995). Another suggested no significant link (Kahn, et 
al., 1990, Rogers, et al., 1990). The “intensity of care” or the “service intensity” is a concept 
to describe the measurement of complexity, amount, content, or attendant risk of medical 
services provided. There is variety of indication about the intensity of care, for example: the 
numbers of order for medication, number for orders for treatment or diagnosis, number of 
orders for special materials or devices, or the number of inpatient physician visits. (Cheng, et 
al., 2012, John et al., 2009)  
In Taiwan, one nationwide population-based study selected patients who underwent 
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) or percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty 
(CTCA) in 2009-2010. The goal was to study the NHI claim database to find out if medical 
behaviors and health outcome changed after the implementation of Tw-DRGs for diagnosis 
listed in the cardiovascular surgical DRG category (Major Diagnosis Classification [MDC] 5, 
Disease and Disorders of the Circulatory system). In this study, cases with CABG or CTCA 
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procedures incorporated in the Tw-DRG during or after 2010 were considered as the 
intervention group (10,824 subjects in the pre-DRG period and 10,824 subjects in the 
post-DRG period) and cases with the similar procedures which are paid by fee-for-service 
schemes were considered as comparison group (included 28,415 subjects in each of the pre- 
and post-DRG periods). They used LOS, numbers of medical orders as proxy for intensity of 
care, the likelihood of ER visits within three days after discharge, the mortality rate with 30 
days after discharge, and the 30 days readmission rate as the index for health outcome. The 
result showed that there was a 10% decrease of LOS and slightly declining intensity of care 
after implementing Tw-DRGs. Additionally, no significant change of health outcome before 
or after was found (Cheng, et al., 2012).  
Hsiu- Mei Lin studied 514 cases of total knee replacement in a Taiwan medical center 
from January 2009 through December 2010 in order to compare the outcome of the 
implementation of Tw-DRGs. She used the data of composition of hospitalization fee and 
implementation rate of 65% minimum requirement service items as an index of medical 
behavior; LOS, health insurance hospitalization medical fee, total hospitalization medical fee 
and Orthopedic outpatient fee after discharge as index of medical efficiency. Additionally, 
adding the factors of patient safety events, ER visits within 3 days of dismissal, and 
re-admission within 14 and 30 days after discharge as index of medical quality. She used 
Logistics Regression and Poisson regression to analyze the data after controlling variations 
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such as patient characteristics, OPD treatment situation, hospitalization medical behavior and 
OPP for TKR material. The result showed that there were medical behavior change and an 
increase of medical efficiency after the implementation of Tw-DRGs. There was significant 
reduction of hospitalization total fee (2.69%), diagnosis fee, rehabilitation fee, treatment fee, 
drug and pharmaceutical service fee. The reduction of the medicine fee was related to the 
decrease in usage of antibiotics and an increase usage of local anesthesia compared with the 
pre-TW-DRGs situation. OPD fee was increase after the patient discharge (1.43%). The rate 
of LOS in less than 7 days increased (OR-2.44), whereas the hospitalization medical fee 
reduced 1.023%, and the total hospitalization medical fee (including OPP) reduced by 2.69%. 
There was no significant change of hospitalization patient safety events, or patients with 
complications and comorbidity rate within the 30 days data after discharging (Lin, 2011). 
Kuei-Miao Kuo analyzed a similar issue. She used data regarding patients who received 
CABG surgery before the implementation of Tw-DRGs in 2009 (n=109) or after the 
implementation in 2010 (n=86) from a “2005 sampling cohort database of 1,000,000 
insured’s” National Health Insurance Research Database (NHIRD). The results show there 
are low levels and insignificant drops of LOS and medical expense after TW-DRG. The cost 
shifting phenomena was not detected, and medical care quality did not change after 
implementing the TW-DRGs system. However, the researcher herself claimed that one of the 
major limitations of this research is the less than representative database “2005 sampling 
Reviewing the Implementation and Outcome of the Taiwan Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) Payments System 
 
25 
 
cohort database of 1,000,000 insured’s” (Kao, 2012). There were more than 6,000 cases per 
year of CABG in Taiwan (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2010). 
This behavioral change by medical service personnel could be explained by economic 
theory. Cutler claims that medical services tend to reduce resource utilization when faced 
with zero marginal revenue to yield more benefit. 
Financial Impact 
Financial influence of DRGs-based payment system proves complex. Chun-Jen Ting 
used relational database technology and decision trees to analyze the National Health 
Insurance database from 2000 to 2009, and simulate the impact of implementation of the 
Tw-DRGs on the pediatric surgery department income. The results showed that after 
implementation of the Tw-DRGs system, the income of pediatric surgery inpatient 
department will reduce by NTD$ 90,498,202 (5.3%). According to the analysis, there were 
only four diseases: hernia (2.4%), appendicitis (4.3%), pyloric obstruction (4.5%) and 
intussusception (22.8%) that would have increased earnings. Nine congenital malformation 
diseases reduced profit after the implementation of Tw-DRGs, and four diseases reduced by 
more than 30%, such as hypospadias (37.7%), bile duct cysts (30.8%), intestinal atresia and 
stenosis (30.1%) and biliary atresia (30.0%) (Tin, 2010). 
Another study shows there was the financial impact varied by hospital. Even in the same 
hospital, departments feel dissimilar influence: e.g., those associated with acute and serious 
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disease had more negative financial impact after implementation (Hsueh, 2006). Wei-Ren 
Long’s research, which focused on a regional hospital, shows that implementation of DRGs 
increased the amount of medical benefits while decreasing length of hospitalization and 
examination fee. Long also compared financial situations between departments. Orthopedics 
saw examination and radiation fees drop by remarkable amounts, surgical benefits got 
appreciably higher. In Cardiology, radiation examination fees dipped sharply; while 
Obstetrics & Gynecology recorded no significant changes (Long, 2011). Shu-chiao Chien 
used the hospital management of 2009, data collected from S non-profit hospital located in 
Southern Taiwan to simulate analysis of the financial change before and after the 
implementation of TW-DRGs. The result showed the profitability of his philanthropic 
hospital decreased 0.44%. The profit margin decreased 0.49%, operating margin in medical 
treatment segment decreased 0.03% and the return on net assets (RONA) decreased 0.51%. 
Even after reactive policy changes such as improving diagnosis coding, standardizing 
treatment disposals, improving hospitalization management, and substituting medicine or 
special materials were implemented. These changes were considered as ways to increase the 
beneficial effects (Chien, 2010). 
Disease Severity and Explanatory power 
As previously described, Tw-DRGs system was originally based on CMS-DRGs V18.0. 
Horn et al. discussed how the most controversial issue of CMS-DRGs is inaccurate reflection 
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of illness severity (Horn et al, 1985). CMS-DRGs’ lower explanatory power was due to a lack 
of accounting for illness severity, which is associated with resource cost to medical service 
providers (Tseng et al., 2006; Rossnagel et al., 2005; Yoneda et al., 2005).  
One cross-sectional study in Taiwan probes illness severity’s effect on study population 
with a diagnosis of cerebrovascular disorders under the Tw-DRGs payment system. The 
research used patient medical records and data collected form the National Health Insurance 
Research Original Claim Data in 2007: Inpatient expenditures by admissions (NO. SN9602) 
and Registry for contracted medical facilities (NO. AN9601). The dependent variables are 
defined as medical expenditure and LOS, and the independent variable is the illness severity 
(with or with complication/comorbidity). The diagnostic groups (DRG 014), gender and the 
age are control variables. There are two main results in this study. First, higher illness 
severity means more medical resource utilization of DRG 014. Second, the study shows 
explanatory power of medical expenditure in MS-DRGs higher than that in Tw-DRGs under 
similar clinical situation. Explanatory power is measured by coefficient of determination (R2) 
of medical expenditures and LOS between each DRGs version. The explanatory power of the 
medical expenditure in MS-DRGs is 17.02%, which is higher than that in Tw-DRGs 
(10.68%). The explanatory power of MS-DRGs about LOS is 7.71%, which is also higher 
than those in Tw-DRGs (5.10%). Table 4 shows the difference between CMS-DRGs and 
MS-DRGs. (Yan, 2011) 
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Table 4. Comparison between CMS-DRGs and MS-DRGs 
 CMS-DRG MS-DRG 
Adaptive Object Medicare Medicare 
Developers Health Care Financing 
Administration 
Health Care Financing 
Administration 
Development Time Since 1983 Since 2007 
Reference Version Nil CMS-DRGs 
DRGs quantity 526 745 
Complication/comorbidity Two levels classification 
With CC 
Without CC 
Three levels classification 
without CC/MCC 
with CC 
With MCC 
Source: Han, 2010; Wynn (2008); Quinn (2008); Healthcare Financial Management (2008)  
If the DRGs-based payment system fails to reflect medical resource utilization 
accurately, negative effects can ensue: e.g., cost shifting (Feldstein, 1999; Menke, 1990), 
DRG Creep (O’Malley et al., 2005), and patient dumping (Rose, 1989).  
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Conclusion and Suggestions 
This capstone has reviewed the development and the major evolution of DRGs-based 
payment system, the establishment of Tw-DRGs in Taiwan, and recent studies. Taiwan has a 
single-payer health care system. All people participate in NHI by paying premiums to the 
Bureau of National Health Insurance and obtain medical resources with comprehensive and 
uniform benefits package.  
According to the studies collected therein, scientific evidence shows that there were 
changes of medical behaviors such as slightly declining intensity of care, and an increase of 
medical efficiency after the implementation of Tw-DRGs. No significant patients’ health 
outcome change was found. Implementation of Tw-DRGs exerted variant financial impact on 
different hospitals and departments. However, the profitability was negatively impacted 
among the study hospitals. Departments associated with acute and serious disease felt worse 
financial impact after implementation. The disease severity and explanatory power of 
Tw-DRGs could be another potential problem. Higher illness severity is related to more 
medical resource utilization, but the lower explanatory power of Tw-DRGs because of lack of 
accounting for illness severity could have negative effects such as cost shifting or patient 
dumping. 
For hospital or healthcare providers, some ideas that could have positive effects include 
improving diagnosis coding, standardizing treatment disposals, or improving hospitalization 
Reviewing the Implementation and Outcome of the Taiwan Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) Payments System 
 
30 
 
management to maintain the profitability and medical quality at the same time. Adequately 
increasing the medical efficiency is the key. On the other hand, BNHI should consider 
modifying Tw-DRGs by increasing explanatory power to augment financial efficiency, in 
order to fit the disease severity. Additionally, taking into account other factors that could 
affect the medical financing system such as culture, medical worker quantity and quality is 
vital. Although published research does not document the DRG creeps phenomenon 
(deliberately up-coding methods to enhance reimbursement). This phenomenon is still 
discussed widely by multimedia, forums and conferences. It is suggested that future studies 
should focus on the result of this phenomenon. 
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